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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I consider how the level of democracy moderates the relationship between 
decentralization and corruption. While there is an expectation within the policy community 
that decentralization prevents corruption, previous research on this relationship has been 
inconclusive. I argue that the potential for decentralization to curb corruption is dependent 
on the presence of institutions that give citizens information on government behavior and 
the capacity to act upon the given information. I therefore predict that decentralization 
promotes less corrupt activities in democratic countries, but not in authoritarian countries 
where no such institutions exist. Using numerous decentralization indicators in a cross-
sectional regression with up to 72 countries in the sample, the data lend support to democ-
racy’s conditional effect on the relationship between decentralization and corruption. I find 
that fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization are associated with lower 
corruption levels in democracies and higher corruption in authoritarian countries. There is, 
however, no robust impact of political decentralization upon corruption levels, which indi-
cates that political decentralization overall is an ineffective tool for curbing corruption. 
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Introduction 
 
Corruption — the abuse of official power or position for private gain — is a widespread 
phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. There is growing awareness that 
corruption is not just morally repugnant, but also one of the greatest obstacles to economic 
and social development (Bardhan 1997). Much attention has therefore been given in recent 
years to the causes of corruption and potential ways of preventing it. This paper explores 
one potential remedy and also possible cause of corruption: decentralization. 
        Decentralization refers to the transfer of responsibilities and resources from central 
government to local governments. Decentralizing reforms have been at the center of policy 
transformations not only within the developed world, but also in many developing coun-
tries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Bardhan 2002). Today “some 95 percent of democracies 
[…] have elected subnational governments, and countries everywhere—large and small, rich and poor—are 
devolving political, fiscal, and administrative powers to subnational tiers of government” (World Bank 
1999: 107). The world-wide decentralization process has been envisaged by national gov-
ernments, international organizations, and the civic society as a process that brings gov-
ernments closer to people and thus improves accountability and transparency (Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra 2009; Pina-Sánchez 2014). Even though the motivations to decentralize 
respond to different issues for each country, there are some common elements behind the 
decentralization trend. One such element is the notion that centralized governments pro-
mote corrupt behavior and that vertical power-sharing is a way of reducing corruption. This 
notion has made commitment to decentralization reforms an important part of donor sup-
ported anti-corruption strategies in developing countries. Today, decentralization reform 
plays an important role in campaigns like the World Bank’s anti-corruption and develop-
ment strategy (Fjeldstad 2004: 1; Lessman and Markwardt 2009: 642). 
        But is decentralization an appropriate remedy for corruption? The academic literature 
is inconclusive. Among existing cross-country studies, some scholars have found that cor-
ruption is lower in decentralized countries (de Mello and Barenstein 2001; Fisman and Gatti 
2000; Arikan 2004; Freille et al 2007; Altunbaş and Thornton 2012), while others have 
found that corruption increases with more decentralization (Treisman 2000; Gerring and 
Thacker 2004; Fan et al 2009). Evidently, more work is needed in this area to resolve these 
findings.  
        Previous studies have largely overlooked the domestic context, and especially the type 
of political regime under which decentralization occurs. This paper revisits the relationship 
  
between decentralization and corruption and presents a more fine-tuned understanding on 
the importance of context. More precisely, the aim of this paper is to explore if the transfer 
of power to sub-national tiers of government may yield different results in democracies 
compared to authoritarian countries. 
        The key hypothesis driving this paper is that the relationship between decentralization 
and corruption is driven by the level of democracy within a country. The hypothesis is that 
the potentially good effects of decentralization upon corrupt behavior only occur in coun-
tries that have a certain level of democracy and that authoritarian countries are unable to 
harness the positive effects expected by decentralization. Decentralization is said to reduce 
corruption because it brings government closer to citizens and increases accountability and 
citizens’ possibilities to monitor government officials. Decentralization is also said to in-
crease competition between sub-jurisdictions, which will curb corruption. For these sug-
gested mechanism to work, a country need democratic institutions that can provide citizens 
with information about the behavior of government officials and give citizens capacity to 
act upon the available information; institutions such as free and fair elections, press free-
dom, freedom of speech, and freedom of domestic movement. Without democratic institu-
tions, it is unlikely that decentralization reforms will curb corruption. Thus, I argue that the 
political regime under which decentralization occurs is likely to have great impact upon its 
effectiveness. 
        Botswana and Zimbabwe offer anecdotal evidence supporting this hypothesis. Both of 
these countries undertook substantial decentralization reforms during the 1980s and 1990s. 
These reforms involved significant changes in expenditure, personnel, and service functions 
(Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990; Wunsch 2001). But while Botswana today is Africa’s least corrupt 
country, the neighbor country Zimbabwe is heavily burden with corruption (Langa 2014). 
The use of local councils in Zimbabwe were meant to transform Zimbabwean society, but 
the outcomes of decentralization reforms have been largely disappointing, with local coun-
cils that have failed to effectively govern and instead have bred corruption and ineffectivity 
(Chatiza 2010). A major difference between Botswana and Zimbabwe is that Botswana is a 
stable democracy, while Zimbabwe is an authoritarian country. This difference might be 
crucial for how decentralization affect corruption levels. 
        To answer the question on whether the level of democracy determines the effect of 
decentralization on corruption, I employ a cross-sectional regression analysis where I test 
for several decentralization measures. Unlike most previous studies, I do not find any sig-
nificant unconditional effects on corruption of the most common decentralization varia-
bles. I do however, in line with my hypothesis, find that fiscal and administrative decentral-
  
ization has a significant effect upon corruption when interacted with the level of democra-
cy.  Fiscally and administratively decentralized countries under authoritarian rule experience 
more corruption, while fiscally or decentralized democratic countries experience less cor-
ruption. There is, however, no robust impact of political decentralization on corruption 
levels. My results thus imply that the appropriateness of fiscal and administrative decentral-
ization as a tool to prevent corruption depends on the level of democracy within a country, 
and that political decentralization overall is an ineffective tool for curbing corruption.   
        This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review previous theoretical and em-
pirical contributions which have explored how decentralization may affect corruption. 
Thereafter I develop my theoretical argument and specify which research question and 
hypothesis that will be tested. In section 3, I present my data and method, and in section 4 I 
present the results of the empirical analysis. In the concluding part of the paper, I discuss 
the results and suggest directions for future research. 
 
Previous research and theory 
 
In the following section, I outline previous research on the relationship between decentrali-
zation and corruption. I begin the section with explaining central concepts, continue with 
outlining theory and empirical results from previous research, and build a theoretical argu-
ment as to why the level of democracy should matter to the relationship between decentral-
ization and corruption. I conclude the section with the research question and hypothesis 
that will be tested. 
 
What is decentralization? 
People mean different things when they use the concept of decentralization and I therefore 
need to make some clarifications of how decentralization is defined in this paper. Here, 
decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and resources from the national govern-
ment to sub-national levels of government. A decentralized government has levels of gov-
ernment at a disaggregated geographical level below the central government (Rodden 2004; 
Kolstad et al 2014). Decentralization can be used to describe either the static state of being 
decentralized or the process of becoming so (Treisman 2002). In this paper, decentraliza-
tion is used to describe the state of being decentralized. Some scholars define decentraliza-
tion dichotomously – either a country is decentralized or centralized – or it can, as in this 
paper, rather be defined as a matter of degree. In this understanding of the concept, a coun-
  
try can be more or less decentralized; sub-national governments can have more or less re-
sponsibilities and resources. 
         Different dimensions of decentralization can be distinguished. Researchers typically 
distinguish between political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization. Political decentrali-
zation refers to the presence of directly elected local governments and/or allocated deci-
sion-making powers at the sub-national levels of government. Administrative decentralization 
refer to local governments’ powers to hire and fire local staff. Administrative decentraliza-
tion can also mean a decentralized structure where sub-national governments are given 
resources to implement central government policy, but do not have power to decide policy. 
Fiscal decentralization gives local governments power to tax citizens and firms, and to de-
cide how to spend the tax revenue through local budgets.  (Kolstad et al 2014). In the pre-
vious literature, most attempts to measures decentralization have focused predominantly on 
fiscal decentralization.  
         It is useful to distinguish between these various types of decentralization in order to 
get a more comprehensible understanding of the concept of decentralization and to get a 
better appreciation of the practical variations in intergovernmental design. China and India 
are, for example, two countries with a decentralized government structure. But China has a 
high degree of fiscal decentralization and no form of political decentralization, while in 
India the case is the opposite (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). In practice, there is often an 
overlap between the different decentralization dimensions. Political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralization can also be designed in different ways not only across countries, but 
also within countries and even within sectors (World Bank 1999). The vertical design of 
governmental arrangement in decentralized countries is thus practically as varied as the 
number of countries.  
 
The impact of decentralization on corruption 
Corruption is defined as the abuse of official power for private gain, where “private gain” 
can be either to the individual official or to a certain groups to which the individual official 
belongs (e.g., Treisman 2007). In the literature, is it commonly distinguished between petty 
and grand corruption. Petty corruption includes activities when citizens pay small bribes to 
government officials in order to get a government service or to avoid a fine. Grand corrup-
tion refers to bribes paid by business or interest groups to gain influence in the decision-
making of governments (Neudorfer and Neudorfer 2015). When corruption is discussed in 
relation to decentralization and the vertical organization of government, the focus is usually 
on grand corruption. 
  
       Several theoretical arguments have been developed to explore the question of whether 
decentralization leads to more or less corruption. There is no clear conclusion from the 
literature about the relationship between decentralization and corruption, and competing 
theories provide arguments both for and against decentralization’s potential as a remedy 
against corruption. Scholars draw upon different mechanisms, but most arguments follow 
either a competition or an accountability logic. These two lines of reasoning will be discussed in 
turn in the following sections. 
 
Jurisdictional competition 
The competition logic follows the classic argument of Tiebout (1956) who claimed that decen-
tralization allows for better realization of diverse individual demands. Tiebout argued that 
decentralization introduce competition between sub-jurisdictions and an opportunity for 
jurisdictions to offer varying government services and tax rates. This allow citizens to “vote 
with their feet” and move from one jurisdictions to another to maximize their personal 
utility. Local governments must tailor policies to attract residents and this, according to 
Tiebout, leads to more efficient provision of public goods. Based on this competition logic, 
other political economists have claimed that the competition among local governments for 
capital, labor and other factors of production forces local decision-makers and bureaucrats 
to reduce corruption. Bureaucrats and decision-makers that steal or waste resources will 
lose businesses and residents to other jurisdictions, which will reduce the local govern-
ment’s tax base. In this way, inter-jurisdictional competition will discipline local govern-
ments and contribute to a less corrupt government (Schleifer and Vishny 1993; Weingast 
1995; Arikan 2004).  
       By contrast, some scholars argue that jurisdictional competition might instead increase 
corruption. The fear of losing mobile factors might lead to what Rose-Ackerman (1999: 
151) calls “destructive competition”. Competition among local governments may lead to a race 
to the bottom that will have negative effects on government quality and corruption levels 
(Keen and Marchand 1997). Local governments competing for business might be encour-
aged to promise firms to protect them from central law enforcement and thus corruption 
increases (Cai and Treisman 2004).  
 
Accountability 
The second line of reasoning about the relationship between decentralization and corrup-
tion, is that decentralization affects accountability - as in the ability to hold government offi-
cials responsible for their actions. Decentralization brings government closer to citizens, 
  
and while some argue that this closeness increases accountability and reduces corruption, 
others claim that it rather reduces accountability and provides more opportunities and less 
obstacles for corrupt activities.    
         The idea that decentralization increases accountability comes with the assumption 
that the closeness in local communities makes it easier for citizens to get information about 
government behavior and to sanction “bad” behavior, which limits the possibility for rent-
seeking in the local government. Smaller size of communities can make it clearer for citi-
zens who is responsible for policies and their implementation. The smallness can also make 
it easier for citizens to monitor the behavior of public officials (Fan et al 2009). As Manor 
(2011: 4) argues, decentralization “tends strongly to enhance transparency since even when elites domi-
nates, information about local council proceedings usually reaches many more people than in the days when 
decisions were taken at higher levels”. The closeness at the local level might also make it easier to 
sanction corrupt behavior, and the relative small number of citizens at the local level might 
present less of a collective action problem in doing so through elections, protest, social 
sanctions or other types of influence (Kolstad 2014). The closeness on the local level might 
also, as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2001) argue, make local decision-makers more interested 
and effective in monitoring the activities of local government bureaucrats than distant audi-
tors and civil servants ever will be.  
         There are some counter-arguments to the idea that decentralization improve account-
ability. The promise that decentralization brings accountability is considered hollow by 
Tanzi (1995), who argues that decentralization brings officials in too close contact with citi-
zens. The close contact, according to Tanzi, promotes personalism which breeds corrup-
tion as officials pay greater attention to individual citizens needs rather than the public in-
terest. Prud’homme (1995) agree with this opinion, arguing that decentralization is likely to 
increase corruption also because a greater influence of interest groups at the local level and 
that the long tenure of local officials at the same place makes it easier to establish unethical 
relationship. The intimate interactions at the local level can foster the formation of corrup-
tion networks (Fan et al 2009). 
        Another common counter-argument to the idea that decentralization improves ac-
countability, is that decentralization fragments the political system and create more compli-
cated decision-making. This allows for credit-taking and blame-shifting between different 
level of units in the system which might undermine accountability and increase corruption 
levels (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Fan et al 2009). Fan et al (2009) 
emphasize that local corruption can be concealed at least as well as corruption at central 
level, especially since media generally tend to monitor national governments more closely 
  
than local governments. There are less obstacles to corruption since “[…] in a fragmented 
system there are fewer centralized forces and agencies to enforce honesty” (Banfield 1979: 98). 
 
Previous empirical results 
The theoretical debate on the relationship between decentralization and corruption is not 
yet settled and it is also hard to draw any clear conclusions about the relationship from 
existing empirical studies. The empirical results from previous cross-country studies are 
inconsistent: while some studies have found that decentralized countries are less corrupt, 
other studies have found the opposite result. Existing studies use different measurements, 
time periods, and samples which might be one explanation for the inconsistent results. For 
an overview of previous empirical cross-country studies that have focused on fiscal, admin-
istrative and/or political decentralization, see table 1.       
 
TABLE 1, SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES ON DECENTRALIZATION 
AND CORRUPTION    
Authors 
Dimensions of decen-
tralization 
Corruption measures 
No. of coun-
tries 
Main results 
Treisman (2000) Fiscal & political CPI; WGI 55 to 89 Negative 
de Mello and Baren-
stein (2001) 
Fiscal ICRG 66 to 78 Positive 
Fisman and Gatti 
(2002) 
Fiscal CPI; ICRG 32 to 55 Positive 
Arikan (2004) Fiscal CPI 24 to 40 Positive 
Kolstad et al (2004) Political TI’s GCB 36 Negative 
Gurgur and Shah 
(2005) 
Fiscal & administrative CPI 30 Positive 
Treisman (2007) Fiscal WGI 54 No relationship 
Enikolopov and 
Zhuravskaya (2007) 
Fiscal & political CPI; WBC 45 to 75 Positive 
Freille et al (2008) Fiscal & political CPI; ICRG; WBC 37 to 174 
Positive with fiscal, negative 
with political 
Fan et al (2009) Fiscal & administrative 
World business envi-
ronment survey 
25 to 67 Negative 
Lessman and Mark-
wardt (2009) 
Fiscal  CPI; ICRG; WGI 44 to 64 
Positive if there is press free-
dom, negative if not 
Kyriacou and Roca-
Sagalés (2011) 
Fiscal & political WGI 63 to 99 
Positive with fiscal, but negative 
when combined with political 
Altunbaş and Thornton 
(2012) 
Fiscal & administrative ICRG Up to 64 Positive 
Pina-Sánchez (2014) 
Fiscal, political & adminis-
trative 
CPI; ICRG; WGI 33 No relationship 
Comment: ‘Positive results’ mean that decentralization is associated with less corruption. CPI = Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index. ICRG = the Political Risk Service Groups International Country 
Risk Guide. WGI = the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
  
         Most studies on decentralization and corruption have focused on fiscal decentraliza-
tion. Among those studies, de Mello and Barenstein (2001), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Ari-
kan (2004) and Freille et al (2008) conclude in large cross-country studies that a larger sub-
national share of government expenditure is associated with lower corruption levels. Treis-
man (2007), on the other hand, report that fiscal decentralization have an insignificant ef-
fect on corruption if one control for the percentage of Protestants in the population. When 
Treisman more recently returned to the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
corruption, he and his colleagues find that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption, even 
controlling for the number of Protestants, but that more tiers of government increase cor-
ruption (Fan et al 2009). In another study by Pina-Sánchez (2014) the results indicate that 
there is no relationship at all between fiscal decentralization and corruption. As such, there 
are no straightforward answers about the effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption. 
        Few studies have focused on administrative decentralization. Among those that have, 
the findings are just as inconclusive. Gurgur and Shah (2005) find that decentralization 
measured by the sub-national share of government employment reduces corruption. In 
similar study, based on survey data on experience of businessmen, Fan et al (2009) find the 
opposite result: the larger the sub-national share of civilian government employment, the 
higher the amount of bribery.  
         Among studies that focus on the relationship between political decentralization and 
corruption the pattern is clearer. Although most scholar use different definitions and meas-
urements of political decentralization, most studies find that politically decentralized coun-
tries have higher corruption levels. Treisman (2000), on the other hand, find no statistically 
significant effect between political (electoral and decision-making) decentralization and 
corruption. Recognizing that it might not be the degree of political decentralization in isola-
tion, but rather how political decentralization interacts with the fiscal resources available to 
sub-national governments, he interacts fiscal and political decentralization but find no sta-
tistically significant results on this either. Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011), on the other 
hand, find such an interaction effect. They report that fiscal decentralization alone lead to 
higher government quality, but not if it is accompanied with political decentralization. 
 
What’s democracy got to do with it? 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between decentralization and 
corruption has so far paid little attention to regime types and their impact upon this rela-
tionship. More focus need to be put upon the relevance of political regimes since they most 
likely condition the relationship between decentralization and corruption. If regime types 
  
determine the effect of decentralization on corruption, it might be another explanation for 
the inconsistent results in the empirical literature on the relationship between decentraliza-
tion and corruption: the relationship might not be linear, but conditioned on political re-
gimes. 
        Political regime here refers to the form of government within a country, ranging from 
highly democratic to extremely authoritarian regimes. In democracies, there are “institutional 
arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 2011[1947]: 269) and civil liberties are re-
spected and protected. Authoritarian regimes are best thought of as a residual category to 
democracy; they are “non-democracies” (Alvarez et al 1996: 6).  
        I base my argument as to why political regimes probably condition the relationship 
between decentralization and corruption on previously developed theoretical models. There 
are, as presented above, theoretical arguments both for and against decentralization’s po-
tential to reduce corruption. Common for all the theoretical models claiming that corrup-
tion levels will be lower in decentralized countries, is that they all base their arguments on 
mechanisms that are only guaranteed in democratic countries. In order to achieve jurisdic-
tional competition, for example, there must be institutions present supporting free infor-
mation flows to citizens and firms. Without freedom of information, people cannot com-
pare policy outcomes and government quality in their home region with other jurisdiction. 
For citizens to be able to “vote with their feet” citizens must have the liberty to move 
where they want – a freedom that is restricted in many authoritarian countries (Beyani 
2000). For decentralization to improve accountability, citizens must have free access to 
information about the behavior of government officials and the capacity to act upon the 
information. For this, institutions such as press freedom, free and fair elections, civil liber-
ties, responsive opposition groups, and independent non-governmental groups are crucial.  
         In short, the theoretical models that predict lower corruptions levels in decentralized 
countries assumes the presence of formal institutions that give citizens information on government 
operations and the capacity to act upon the given information. From the existing theoretical models, it 
seems very unlikely to expect decentralization to have a positive effect on corruption in a 
context where no such democratic institutions exist. The effect of decentralization is likely 
to be more benign in countries with democratic institutions, where elections, free media 
and civil liberties more effectively promote government accountability. The level of democ-
racy is thus likely to condition the relationship between decentralization and corruption.  
         We know from previous research that political regimes significantly influence the 
level of corruption within a country. The general argument is that higher levels of democra-
  
cy and political freedom enhances checks-and-balances mechanisms which increase trans-
parency in the public sector and forces decision-makers to be less corrupt. Many empirical 
studies have indeed found evidence that higher levels of democracy reduce corruption (e.g., 
Treisman 2000; Ades and Di Tella 1997; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Some find-
ings do, however, suggest that the relationship between democracy and corruption is non-
linear. Although there is some disagreement as to the reasons to the relationship, the gen-
eral finding is that corruption is highest in partially democratizes countries, medium-high in 
authoritarian countries, and lowest in strong, older democracies (Keefer 2007; Bäck and 
Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010). Subsequently, stable democratic institutions 
are proven to be an effective deterrent factor against corruption, and thus it seems reasona-
ble to expect the level of democracy to be influential to how decentralization affects cor-
ruption. 
        No scholar has yet convincingly tested if decentralization reforms yield different re-
sults upon corruption in democratic versus authoritarian countries. Two previous cross-
country studies have empirically tested if some dimension of democracy might influence 
the relationship between decentralization and corruption. One of the studies (Kyriacou and 
Roca-Sagalés 2011) finds that there is no interaction effect, while the other study (Lessman 
and Markwardt 2009) find a significant interaction effect. In both studies, they interact 
decentralization with variables that do not adequately capture democracy, and thus they 
leave the question unanswered to whether the level of democracy condition the effect of 
decentralization on corruption or not. 
       In the first study, Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011) aim to test if the experience of 
democratic rule influences the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government 
quality (defined as control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of law). They claim 
that the effectiveness of decentralization as a tool to improve government quality might be 
affected by the experience of democratic rule and how deeply rooted democratic norms and 
practices are in the society. Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés test this proposition with a simple 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has been classified as a democratic all 
years between 1950 and 1995, and the value 0 if not. They find no interaction effect, and 
therefore conclude that democratic maturity does not condition the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and corruption.  
       I argue that Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés’ dummy variable is not a satisfying operational-
izing of democracy or how deeply rooted democratic norms are among citizens. The results 
of their analysis where this dummy variable is used does not rule out the fact that there 
might be an interaction effect between decentralization and democracy. The time span 
  
“1950 to 1995” of the dummy is arbitrary, and that a country has been classified as demo-
cratic since 1950 does not guarantee that the country has more well-functioning democratic 
institutions compared to a country that has been democratized for 40 years or 20 years1. 
This measurement does not capture the “depth” of a country’s democratic institutions. 
Democratic “depth” is best captured with a continuous measure of the actual level of de-
mocracy within a country. Being democratic is not an either or factor, but rather a matter of 
degree. Thus, democracy is better operationalized with a continuous measure than a di-
chotomous as this allows for more variance (see Hadenius and Teorell 2005). 
       In the second study, Lessman and Markwardt (2009) focus on only one aspect of dem-
ocratic rule: press freedom. Lessman and Markwardt argue that press freedom is a crucial 
pre-condition for successful decentralization programs and that the benefits of decentraliza-
tion only occurs where there is a free press that monitor the behavior of bureaucrats. They 
test and also find an interaction effect of the level of press freedom and fiscal decentraliza-
tion on corruption. What Lessman and Markwardt have overlooked in their model, howev-
er, is that if the information reaching the public is to actually affect the behavior of corrupt 
officials it must be paired with some sort of sanctioning mechanism available to the public. 
Publicity does not equal accountability (see Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). It is likely that it is 
not only free information flows, but also the capacity to act on information that increase 
accountability and might curb corruption. If citizens do not have the freedom to protest, 
elect, put sanctions or in other ways influence the way the local governments work, availa-
ble information alone will do little to prevent corruption. I therefore take the argument 
Lessman and Markwardt make one step further and claim that a country need both institu-
tions that give citizens information on government behavior (like press freedom) and insti-
tutions that give citizens the capacity to act upon the given information. Therefore, it is 
necessary to focus on the level of democracy, broadly conceived, in order to fully under-
stand the relationship between decentralization and corruption.  
       In sum, no one has yet managed to convincingly answer the question of whether the 
level of democracy conditions the effect of decentralization on corruption. Nonetheless, I 
have reasons to believe that this is the case and I therefore aim to test this in a statistical 
analysis. In contrast to previous studies, I will employ an empirical analysis with a continu-
ous measure that better capture the level of democracy. I will also employ a wider range of 
decentralization measures, moving the focus beyond just fiscal decentralization. 
 
                                                     
1
 In fact, Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés’ measure of democratic maturity is correlated at just 0.48 with the con-
tinuous democracy measurement I use in my analysis. 
  
Research question and hypothesis 
The aim of this paper is to determine if the relationship between decentralization and cor-
ruption depends on the level of democracy within a country. The research question that will 
be answered is Does the level of democracy condition the relationship between decentralization and corrup-
tion?  
 
FIGURE 1, THE FOCAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 In light of the literature reviewed, I expect that only democratic countries have the poten-
tial to harness the advantages of decentralization. Previous theoretical work emphasize on 
two types of mechanisms that might affect the relationship between decentralization and 
corruption: mechanisms affecting jurisdictional competition and mechanisms affecting 
accountability. I expect both types of mechanisms to be influenced by political regimes and 
have different effects depending on the country’s level of democracy. 
        First, the accountability models assume decision-makers to be responsive to citizens’ 
demands and that citizens have the ability to receive information about government behav-
ior. This is by definition not the case in authoritarian countries. Autocrats are not (or at 
least, do not need to be) responsive to citizens’ demands. Citizens in authoritarian countries 
thus have very limited possibilities to sanction government behavior they do not like. Addi-
tionally, in countries where press freedom and freedom of expression are restricted, as is 
the case in most authoritarian states, citizens will have limited opportunities to achieve in-
formation about government behavior no matter at which level of government powers are 
located. Consequently, achieving any of the corruption preventing mechanisms assumed by 
the accountability models is unlikely in authoritarian countries, but might be possible in 
democracies where leaders are responsive to voters and citizens can get information about 
government behavior. 
        Second, the jurisdictional competition models assume that citizens can compare gov-
ernment behavior in different sub-national jurisdiction and act on the given information. 
Decentralization Corruption 
Democracy 
  
This requires conditions for information to be spread and citizens to be able to move freely 
within the country. These conditions are more likely in a democratic country with free press 
and free civil society than in a country where information flows are restricted, which is the 
case in many authoritarian countries. It is also unlikely to achieve jurisdictional competition 
in an authoritarian country like, for example, Zimbabwe where the freedom of movement is 
severely restricted (US Dep. of State 2014) and citizens’ abilities to “vote with their feet” 
are limited. As such, achieving jurisdictional competition is more likely in democracies than 
in authoritarian countries. 
        In sum, it seems unlikely that authoritarian countries are able to harness the potential 
positive effects of decentralization. Decentralization in authoritarian countries will likely be 
overweighed by the potential costs of decentralization. Positive effects of decentralization 
require the presence of formal institutions that give citizens information on the behavior of 
government and the capacity to act upon the given information. These institutions are pre-
sent in democracies, and hence decentralization has a potential to curb corruption in those 
countries. I therefore expect there to be an interaction effect between political regime and 
decentralization and the following hypothesis will be tested:  
 
H1: Decentralization is associated with lower corruption levels in democracies but not in authoritarian 
countries. 
 
Data and method 
 
In this section, I discuss the operationalizations of the central concepts I use when I test 
the proposed hypothesis in a cross-country analysis. The strengths and limitations with the 
data are discussed and so are the methods of analysis.  
 
The dependent variable: Corruption 
Corruption is difficult to measure since the illegality of corrupt activities implies secrecy. 
There are two main types of corruption measures: perception-based and experienced-based. 
Perception-based measures are usually based on expert assessments, while data on experi-
ence-based indicators come from surveys among citizens or business men (Neudorfer and 
Neudorfer 2015). None of these two types of corruption indicators are perfect. The accura-
cy of perception indicators can be questioned since these indicators do not measure corrup-
tion itself, only experts’ perception of corruption. Fan et al (2009) points out that country 
experts might be biased when they evaluate a country’s corruption level and that this might 
  
influence their assessment. On the other hand, citizens answering survey for experience-
based indicator might also be biased, in the same way that expert are. Additionally, experi-
ence-based indicators are only able to measure petty corruption. 
        Since my hypothesis is mainly concerned with grand corruption, which is not effec-
tively measurable with experience-based indices, a perception-based indicator is used to 
measure corruption. Following many other cross-country studies on decentralization and 
corruption (e.g., Treisman 2000; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Arikan 2004; Gurgur and Shah 
2005; Lessman and Markwardt 2009) I use Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ception Index (CPI) as my dependent variable. The CPI indicator measures the absence of 
corruption in the public sector, covering both administrative and political aspects of cor-
ruption. The variable is on a scale from 0-100, with higher values indicating less corruption.  
        To overcome the problem that expert rankings might be inconsistent or unreliable, the 
CPI index consists of aggregated indicators from several sources. Transparency Interna-
tional collects data on corruption from different places, standardize them and calculate 
averages by assigning them equal weights in the index. The CPI data are available from the 
year 1980, but due to some changes in the standardization procedure, comparisons over 
time might be a problem for some years (Rohwer 2009). I use CPI data from 2000-2009, 
which is after the changes in the composition of the index were made and comparisons 
over time should therefore be unproblematic. 
 
The independent variable: Decentralization 
There are different ways of capturing decentralization. My aim is to bring empirics closer to 
theory by recognizing that there are several different dimensions of decentralization. My 
goal is to capture more than one face of decentralization as “researches who not explicitly look at 
each dimension […] will mismeasure the type and degree of decentralization and draw incorrect inferences 
about the relationship between decentralization and other phenomena” (Schneider 2003: 35). Hence, I 
want to use a decentralization indicator that taps on the three main dimensions of decen-
tralization: fiscal, administrative and political.  No single measure of decentralization availa-
ble for a sufficient number of both developing and developed countries adequately captures 
all of these dimensions. I therefore use four different measures of decentralization in the 
statistical analysis.    
        In the literature, the most widely used measure of fiscal decentralization (FISC.DEC) is 
provided by the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). The 
indicator most commonly employed is the sub-national share in total government expendi-
ture. The GFS data are based on national data that are reported by countries’ national de-
  
partments of statistics. The GFS dataset covers a broad range of countries and time periods 
and are standardized to enable comparisons across time and space (Pina-Sánchez 2014: 13).  
To measure fiscal decentralization through the sub-national share of government expendi-
ture has, however, received criticism for a number of reasons. First, this indicator fail to 
identify the degree of autonomy of sub-national government since it does not capture 
whether sub-national governments own the resources spend by them. The measure does 
not differentiate between tax and non-tax revenue and does not capture if transfers from 
central to local governments are conditional or discretionary (Rodden 2004; Pina-Sánchez 
2014). This means that the indicator tends to overestimate the degree of fiscal decentraliza-
tion within a country (Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 2011: 207).  Second, Oates (1999) argue 
sthat the differences in sub-national share of government expenditure between countries 
not only reflect differences in the decentralization policy, but also in the national govern-
ments economic policy. Oates claims that two countries with the exact same decentralized 
structure will appear to have different decentralization structures if one of the countries, for 
example, spending more resources on the army nationally.  
        Although the GFS data on sub-national expenditure has its shortcomings, there is a 
lack of reliable alternatives. I therefore chose to use this indicator to measure fiscal decen-
tralization before any other. Most existing cross-country studies on the relationship be-
tween fiscal decentralization and corruption have used this indicator. Employing this meas-
ure thus allow for comparisons of my results with those found in other studies.  
        To capture administrative decentralization (ADM.DEC), I follow Treisman (2002) and 
Arikan (2004) and use a measure of the sub-national government employment share of the 
total civilian government administration employment. The data come from the World Bank 
Cross-National Data on Government Employment and Wages, and cover a broad range of 
countries. A disadvantage with this data is that they are only available for a limited number 
of years. 
 
  
  
TABLE 2, CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DECENTRALIZATION VARIABLES 
        Since political decentralization can refer both to the presence of elected local governments 
and to the allocation of decision-making powers to local governments, I use two indicators 
of political decentralization that capture these two different aspects. To measure the alloca-
tion of decision-making power (POL.DEC1-Authority), I use a dummy variable from the 
World Bank Database of Political Institution (DPI). This variable indicates whether sub-
national governments have extensive taxing, spending, and/or legislating authority (Beck et 
al 2011: 175). This measure is a sharp test of sub-national agency and capture devolution of 
power better than any other available variable. To measure electoral decentralization 
(POL.DEC2-Electoral), I use a measure developed by Schneider (2003). This indicator is an 
index between 0 and 1 based on a confirmatory factor analysis of the existence of elections 
at local or regional levels in 1996. In this index, also non-competitive elections are included; 
such as local elections when only one party compete or the national government is authori-
tarian (Schneider 2003: 43). 
        Table 2 reports the correlations for all decentralization measures. As seen in the table, 
the correlations between the different decentralization types confirm the suspicion that 
these different decentralization measures taps into different aspects of decentralization. The 
correlation coefficients are relatively low and none of the decentralization types are strongly 
correlated. It is noteworthy that the two different measures of political decentralization 
(POL.DEC1-Authority and POL.DEC2-Electoral) are only correlated at 0.272, which con-
firms that they measure different facets of political decentralization. 
        Figure 2-5 illustrate the cross-country data on decentralization and each country’s 
mean value on the different decentralization types. The maps illustrate how the level of 
 
 
FISC.DEC ADM.DEC 
POL.DEC1- Au-
thority 
POL.DEC2- Elec-
toral  
FISC.DEC 1.000 0.687* 0.313 0.173 
ADM.DEC  1.000 0.516* 0.331* 
POL.DEC1- 
Authority 
  1.000 0.272 
POL.DEC2- 
Electoral 
   1.000 
Comment: *= correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
  
decentralization varies between and also within countries. The maps also illustrate that the 
data on the different decentralization measures cover a somewhat different sample of coun-
tries. I only have data on all four decentralization measures for 24 countries, which makes it 
difficult to include all decentralization indicators in the same analysis.  
 
The moderating variable: Democracy 
I measure the level of democracy with the combined Freedom House and Polity index 
from the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015). This measure is an eleven point index 
ranging from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). The index is combination of 
first, the Freedom House measure of civil liberties and political rights and, second, indica-
tors from the Polity IV Project data set. The Polity data are a combination of three inde-
pendent elements of institutionalized democracy: (i) the presence of institutions and proce-
dures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative politicians 
and leaders, (ii) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive, and (iii) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily life and in acts 
of political participation. The two measures are averaged together. The Freedom 
House/Polity index thus tap into both dimensions of democratic rule that is central for my 
hypothesis: institutions that make information available to citizens and institutions that give 
citizens capacity to act. 
        Hadenius and Teorell (2005) have proven that the combined Freedom House/Polity 
index has several advantages compared to other measures of democracy. When compared 
with other well-established measures of democracy, Hadenius and Teorell find that the 
Freedom House/Polity index outperforms rival measures both in terms of validity and 
reliability.  To control for the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between democracy 
and corruption (Bäck and Hadenius 2008), I square the included democracy variable.  
 
Control variables  
To reduce the likelihood of spurious findings, it is important to consider alternative expla-
nations other than decentralization and the level of democracy that may affect corruption 
levels. The literature on the causes of corruption mainly focuses on four different categories 
of determinants of corruption: (i) economic and demographic factors, (ii) political factors, 
(iii) cultural factors, and (iv) the effect of legal systems. Each of these categories recognize 
 
 
 
  
 
FIGURE 2, DATA ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION (SUB-NATIONAL SHARE OF NATIONAL 
REVENUE) 
 
 
FIGURE 3, DATA ON ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION (SUB-NATIONAL SHARE OF 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT) 
 
 
  
FIGURE 4, DATA ON POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION1 (SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS’ 
DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY OVER TAXING, SPENDING AND LEGISLATION) 
 
FIGURE 5, DATA ON POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION2 (ELECTORAL DECENTRALIZATION,  
SCHNEIDER’S INDEX) 
 
  
alternative explanations of corruption. In my empirical modes, I include a large number of 
control variables from each of these four categories.   
       Concerning the first category of determinants of corruption – economic and demo-
graphic determinants – scholars have found several variables that influence the level of 
corruption across countries. In particular, GDP per capita is found to be significantly linked 
with lower corruption levels. Wealthier countries, in terms of GDP, are less corrupt (e.g., 
La Porta et al 1999, Montinola and Jackman 2002, Persson et al 2003). Trade openness is 
another economic variable that various authors have claimed to explain corruption level 
(Treisman 2000; Fisman and Gatti 2002). Trade openness is defined as the ratio of the sum 
of exports and imports to GDP and more openness is claimed to lead to lower corruption. 
The argument is that trade openness imply lower trade barriers and thus more limited op-
portunities for government officials to interfere and demand bribes.  
       The demographic variable most commonly associated with corruption is human capital 
– usually proxied by education levels. Higher education levels are found to be associated 
with lower corruption. This is explained with education improving the ability of citizens to 
control governments and judge the performance of politicians (Ali and Isse 2003; Persson 
et al 2003). Further economic and demographic variables that might have an extra strong 
importance in terms of decentralization, are factors related to country size. Some scholars 
have found a pattern indicating that countries with larger populations are more corrupt 
(Root 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2000) and Ali and Isse (2003) show that larger government 
sectors are associated with higher corruption levels. These variables of country size are 
extra relevant in terms of decentralization, since larger countries might adopt a more decen-
tralized state structure to better cater to diverse preferences of citizens. This at the same 
time as larger countries are more likely to exploit economies of scale in the provision of 
public services – hence having a low ratio of public services per capita – which might make 
those demanding these services more tempted to bribe bureaucrats to “get ahead of the 
queue” (Fisman and Gatti 2002: 330). 
        Turning to the second category, political institutions, there are several related variables 
that have been claimed to affect corruption levels. Many of those relate to democracy and 
other proxies for political freedom which’s association to corruption already has been dis-
cussed in previous sections. Another aspect of political systems that previous studies sug-
gest affect corruption is how the electoral system is designed. Some scholars report that 
having an open-list proportional system creates less corruption since this system creates a 
direct link between voters and politicians and makes it easier for voters to hold politicians 
accountable (Persson et al 2003). Another political aspect is whether a country has a presi-
  
dential system or a parliamentary system. Some suggest that presidential systems increase 
corruption by creating competition between different branches of government, while others 
suggest that separation of power and many checks and balances curbs corruption (Kunico-
vá and Rose-Ackerman 2005). At last, members of the political elite might affect corrup-
tion. Previous studies on this factor have predominantly focused on the number of women 
in political assemblies and found that more women in national parliaments is associated 
with lower corruption levels (Dollar et al 2001; Swamy et al 2001).  
        Third, cultural factors are highlighted by some corruption studies. Specifically ethno-
linguistic fractionalization is found to be negatively correlated with corruption. More frag-
mented and heterogeneous societies are generally more corrupt, hypothetically because 
people are less likely to be treated fairly and equally in those societies than in homogeneous 
ones (Ali and Isse 2003). Another cultural variable used to explain corruption levels, is the 
proportion of Protestants in the population. The theory is that Protestant traditions foster 
an egalitarian community, which results in a less corrupt society (La Porta et al 1999; 
Treisman 2000). 
        Lastly, the quality of the legal system and legal origin has proven to explain variation in 
corruption levels across countries. The world can be divided into two main legal traditions: 
the common law (originating in English law) and civil law (originating in Roman law) 
(Charron et al 2012). According to La Porta et al (2008) have common law countries expe-
rienced less corruption than civil law countries since legal origin influence how the gov-
ernment control the economy. In a similar manner, Treisman (2000) have found that cor-
ruption is lower in former British colonies that have adopted the British legal system com-
pared to other former colonies.  
        In summary, the literature on corruption shows that corruption is a multi-causal and 
complex phenomenon.  In order to robustly test the explanatory power of my hypothesis, it 
is necessary to test for alternative explanations to corruption in the empirical analysis. I 
therefore include control variable which operationalize these above-mentioned alternative 
explanations to corruption: GDP per capita, trade openness, education levels, population 
size, size of the government, the presence of open-list electoral system, parliamentarism, 
checks and balances, ethnic fractionalization, the proportion of Protestants in the popula-
tion, and British legal origin. I have taken the natural logarithm of the variables GDP per 
capita and population size since both variables originally was skewed. More detailed de-
scription of the included control variables can be found in Appendix I. 
 
 
  
Method of analysis 
My aim is to test if there is support for the hypothesis that decentralization is more likely to 
curb corruption in democracies compared to authoritarian countries. The research design 
consists of multivariate ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions where the units of analysis 
are countries. An OLS regression is a simple and straightforward estimation strategy for 
establishing if there is a possible linear relationship between variables and this is a useful 
statistical method for testing my hypothesis. OLS regression analysis has become a com-
mon method within cross-country studies in political science over the years, signifying that 
it is an established estimation strategy. An alternative statistical method to test my hypothe-
sis would be a time-series analysis. The availability of decentralization data over time is, 
however, too limited - especially for authoritarian countries which are central to include in 
the analysis in order to test the hypothesis. Thus, a cross-sectional OLS regression analysis 
will be preferred. 
        I adopt an empirical approach where the focal relationship is tested in stages. In the 
first stage, I estimate the relationship between the focal variables graphically. In the second 
stage, I provide a baseline for the statistical models by analyzing the general unconditional 
effect of the decentralization variables on corruption in simple additive regression models. 
As a third stage of the analysis, I report the full regression models with my interaction 
terms. I build one interaction term for each decentralization indicator by multiplying de-
mocracy with one of the decentralization indicators. If the effect on the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant, it will indicate that there is support for my hypothesis 
and that the level of democracy does condition the effect between decentralization and 
corruption. The basic equation for the model that is being tested is the following:  
 
corruption = α + β1 democracy + β2 decentralization + β3democracy*decentralization + e 
 
Where α is the intercept, β1 the effect of the level democracy, β2 the effect of the chosen 
decentralization indicator, and β3 the effect of the interaction term. I test this model for 
each of the four decentralization measures. Fourth, as a final stage of the empirical analysis, 
I test the robustness of my findings with new model specifications and extra control varia-
bles. The OLS regression allows me to add multiple control variables to test my models for 
alternative explanations to corruption. The OLS regression is, however, sensitive for having 
too large a number of independent variables. This means that I cannot add all control vari-
ables in the same model but have to add them a few at a time in different models. 
  
       The effects I am studying are long-run factors that do not happen overnight. Following 
the advice of Stern (2010), I use averages for longer time spans to capture these long-run 
factors. All variables are country averages for ten-year periods and this makes my analysis 
less sensitive to short-term variations. Since some of the data are not available for all coun-
tries, the panel is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on which decentrali-
zation variable I use in the regression model.  
        To consider causality issues, I use a lag structure between the dependent and inde-
pendent variables. For the dependent variable – corruption – I use the averages for the 
years 2000-2009. Data on the independent variables are the averages for the years 1990-
1999. For a few of the independent variables (for example, political-electoral decentraliza-
tion and administrative decentralization) data is not available for longer time-spans and on 
these instances I use data from the mid-1990s. Using a lag-structure is not a bulletproof 
method for ensuring the direction of the effect, but it is a certain way of at least decreasing 
the risk of reversed causality and endogenity bias. Detailed descriptions of all the individual 
variables and their sources are presented in Appendix I.  
 
Results 
 
In this section, the results from the statistical analyses are presented and discussed. I start 
with graphically illustrating my data, continue with testing the unconditional effect of the 
decentralization indicators in additive models, and then carry on with testing my hypothe-
sized interaction effects. To check if my results are robust, I then do robustness checks and 
lastly, end with a discussion of the results and the strengths and weakness of the models. 
4.1 Bivariate relationships 
The aim of the analysis is to test if the level of democracy conditions the relationship be-
tween decentralization and corruption. For illustrative purposes, I begin the analysis with 
testing the bivariate relationship between the key variables. For this, I use a binary division 
of countries as either democracies or autocracies, instead of testing a scale of more or less 
democracy. This makes it easier to make a simple graphic assessment of the relationship.  
        The bivariate relationships between the key variables are illustrated in figure 6. The bar 
graphs show the mean corruption levels in decentralized and centralized democracies and 
authoritarian countries. Note that the CPI corruption measure reflects the absence of cor-
ruption and hence higher bars indicate lower corruption.  
        Figure 6a illustrates the difference in mean corruption levels between fiscally central-
ized and fiscally decentralized democracies and dictatorships. When the mean corruption 
  
levels are compared, the bar graph shows that fiscal decentralization seem to have very 
different effects on corruption in democracies and dictatorships. Fiscally decentralized de-
mocracies are generally much less corrupt than centralized democracies. In dictatorships, 
on the other hand, the pattern is quite the opposite: fiscally decentralized dictatorships gen-
erally have higher corruption levels than centralized dictatorships. Figure 6b show a similar 
pattern for administrative decentralization as the one seen in figure 6a. Administratively 
centralized and centralized authoritarian countries seem to have the same corruption levels 
on average, while decentralized democracies are much less corrupt than centralized democ-
racies.  
        In figure 6c and 6d the two variables operationalizing political decentralization are 
illustrated. For both types of political decentralization, we can see a difference between  
 
FIGURE 6, MEAN CORRUPTION LEVELS IN DEMOCRACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN  COUN-
TRIES WITH DIFFERENT DECENTRALIZATION LEVELS 
 
(a)           
(b) 
   
  
(c)           
(d) 
 
Comment: The binary division of political regimes into dictatorships and autocracies is originally from Cheibub et al 
(2010) and taken from the standard QoG dataset (Teorell et al 2015). Countries are classified as fiscally, adminis-
tratively and electorally decentralized when they have a value above 30% on their respective scale. 
 
 
democracies and authoritarian countries. In these cases, however, decentralized countries 
are less corrupt no matter regime type, but the differences are larger among democracies. 
         The illustration of the data in figure 6 offer support to the hypothesis: political re-
gimes seem to condition the effect of decentralization on corruption. These bivariate rela-
tionships do not, however, prove causality. 
         While the bar graphs in figure 6 are primarily illustrative, the scatterplots in figure 7 
through 9 also show the extent to which the relationship is linear. Figure 7 plots the rela-
tionship between fiscal decentralization and corruption. The scatterplot shows how the 
regression slope varies between dictatorships and democracies. The slope of the regression 
line is positive among democracies, and negative among authoritarian countries. Thus there 
seems to exist a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption in democra-
cies: the more decentralized, the less corruption. Among dictatorships, on the other hand, 
there seems to be a negative relationship: more decentralization is associated with more 
corruption. This confirms the findings in figure 6. The R2 value for the regression line in 
figure 7 is much higher for democratic countries than for authoritarian countries: 0.187 
  
compared to 0.048. The decentralization variable can thus explain more of the variance in 
corruption levels among democracies than among dictatorships.  
 
FIGURE 7, SCATTERPLOT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
AND CORRUPTION 
 
 
       Figure 8 shows that the pattern for administrative decentralization looks very similar to 
the pattern for fiscal decentralization. There is a clear difference in the regression slopes 
between democracies and dictatorships, and administrative decentralization seems to be 
associated with the different corruption levels depending on regime type. Taking individual 
examples, we can see that the authoritarian Laos and the democratic Colombia have the 
same degree of administrative decentralization, but there is significantly less corruption in 
Colombia compared to Laos. By looking at the scatterplots, there again seems to be sup-
port for the hypothesis that the level of democracy conditions the effect decentralization on 
corruption, even though the scatterplots alone does not prove causality.  
 
  
FIGURE 8, SCATTERPLOT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE DECEN-
TRALIZATION AND CORRUPTION  
 
 
        Turning to the relationship between political decentralization and corruption, only the 
second political decentralization variables (POL.DEC2-Electoral) can be illustrated in a 
scatterplot since POL.DEC1-Authority is dichotomous.  By a glance, the relationship be-
tween electoral decentralization illustrated in figure 9 seems to be less strong than the  
 
  
  
FIGURE 9, SCATTERPLOT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL DECENTRALIZA-
TION2 (ELECTORAL DECENTRALIZATION) AND CORRUPTION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
relationship between fiscal and administrative decentralization. The slopes in the scatterplot 
illustrating electoral decentralization are less steep than the slopes in the other scatterplots. 
There is still a difference in the slope of the two regression lines in figure 9, and thus there 
seems to be a difference between the effect of electoral decentralization on corruption in 
dictatorships and democracies, although smaller than for the other dimensions of decentral-
ization. There seems to be a positive relationship between more electoral decentralization 
and less corruption among democracies. But among dictatorship there is a non-existing 
relationship; the regression line is straight and have a R2 value of only 0.001.  
        In sum, when the bivariate relationship between the key variables is illustrated, there 
seems to be reason to believe that there is support for my hypothesis. Political regimes 
seem to condition the effect of decentralization on corruption. This seems to be most ap-
parent in terms of fiscal and administrative decentralization. In order to define if these are 
causal relationships, I need to make more sophisticated analyses in a multivariate OLS re-
gression analysis.  
  
 
Additive models 
I continue to analyze the relationships between decentralization and corruption in a multi-
variate framework. To get a baseline regression result, I first estimate the impact of decen-
tralization on corruption without testing for the interaction effect.  This allow me to com-
pare my results and data from those from previous studies. The unconditional effect of 
decentralization might be positive, as Fisman and Gatti (2002) or Freille et al (2007) have 
found, or negative as in the studies of Treisman (2000) or Fan et al (2009).  
      For theoretical reason and comparison, the selection of baseline control variables fol-
lows Fisman and Gatti’s (2002) pioneer study on decentralization and corruption. These 
control variables are GDP per capita, to control for that the results are not driven by 
whether the countries are poor or rich. I also include variables that have to do with the size 
of the country – population size and government size – to capture economies of scale in 
establishing effective institutions. I also control for the squared level of democracy. 
 
  
  
TABLE 3, OLS CROSS-COUNTRY ESTIMATES. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CPI 
 
 
 
       Table 3 reports the results from the additive OLS regression analysis. Again note that 
the CPI indicator measures the absence of corruption and thus a positive b-coefficient on 
the decentralization variables indicate that higher degrees of decentralization is associated 
with lower corruption levels. In table 3, we can derive that fiscal decentralization, adminis-
trative decentralization, and sub-national decision-making authority (POL.DEC1-
Authority) have no significant effect on corruption levels. These results deviates from the 
lion share of the literature, as most studies have found significant effects of decentralization 
and corruption. The reason to why I get insignificant results of most of my variables might 
be because I, unlike scholars in most previous studies, use a lag-structure between the inde-
pendent and dependent variables in my analysis. My data also allow my analysis to include 
more countries than in many previous studies. Other studies that use a lag-structure, like 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Log GDP/capita 
9.816*** 
(2.317) 
12.411*** 
(2.110) 
9.422*** 
(2.137) 
12.889*** 
(2.602) 
Log population 
-1.221 
(1.035) 
-1.385 
(1.234) 
-1.992 
(1.405) 
0.485 
(1.155) 
Government size 
0.101 
(0.069) 
0.024 
(0.168) 
0.280 
(0.220) 
-0.139 
(0.174) 
Democracy 
-7.430*** 
(2.311) 
-4.006 
(2.826) 
-2.465 
(3.299) 
-1.367 
(2.880) 
Democracy
2
 
0.933*** 
(0.209) 
0.518** 
(0.253) 
0.316 
(0.300) 
0.462* 
(0.261) 
FISC.DEC 
0.180 
(0.128) 
   
ADM.DEC   
0.028 
(0.094) 
  
POL.DEC1-Authority   
7.462 
(4.799) 
 
POL.DEC2-Electoral    
-18.185** 
(7.889) 
     
Intercept 
-48.968** 
(20.947) 
-67.527*** 
(19.306) 
-41.673* 
(21.646) 
-81.183*** 
(24.533) 
Obs. 66 72 58 57 
Adj. R
2
 0.759 0.667 0.548 0.768 
Comment: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
Lessman and Markwardt (2009), also get a non-significant result when they test the rela-
tionship between decentralization and corruption.  
       The one decentralization variable that has a significant effect in table 3 is the 
POL.DEC2-Electoral variable, measuring electoral decentralization. This variable has a 
negative and significant effect upon corruption. In more detail, it suggest that the difference 
between a country that scores 1 on the electoral decentralization index will have a lower 
CPI value of 18.185 compared to a country that scores 0 on the index. This negative and 
significant effect of electoral decentralization on corruption goes in line with most previous 
studies.  
       The effect of the control variables are in line with past research, which gives support to 
my models. The coefficient on the GDP per capita is statistically significant and of the ex-
pected sign: wealthier countries are less corrupt. There is squared democracy variable is 
also, as expected, showing a significant non-linear effect of democracy on corruption. 
The size of the country in terms of population and size of the government have no signifi-
cant effect on corruption levels. 
       The insignificant effects of the decentralization variables in model 1, 2 and 3 in table 3 
support the idea that the relationship between decentralization and corruption might not be 
linear. These baseline results thus give me reason to test if the relationship between decen-
tralization and corruption is conditioned on the level of democracy, as the graphic illustra-
tions have suggested.  
 
Interaction models 
In table 4, the hypothesis that the level of democracy conditions the relationship between 
democracy and corruption is tested in a multivariate regression analysis through four inter-
action terms. In each model in table 4, an interaction term including democracy and one of 
my four decentralization variables is tested. As hypothesized, there are indeed significant 
positive effects on the interaction variables for both fiscal, administrative and the two polit-
ical decentralization indicators. This means that decentralization have a more positive effect 
on corruption levels the higher the level of democracy is in a country. Democracy thus 
seems to condition the effect of decentralization on corruption. The R2 values in the mod-
els in table 4 are higher than for the equivalent models in table 3. The models in table 4 
with the interaction effect thus have stronger explanatory power and represent a higher fit 
of the data. This gives further support for my hypothesis. 
 
 
  
TABLE 4, OLS CROSS-COUNTRY ESTIMATES. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CPI 
 
 
       Focusing specifically on model 1, the negative sign of the fiscal decentralization varia-
ble means that fiscal decentralization leads to lower CPI (i.e. higher corruption levels) when 
the country is extremely authoritarian. On the contrary, the effect of decentralization re-
verses in more democratic countries, as the positive sign of the interaction term indicates. 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Log GDP/capita 
10.302*** 
(2.112) 
11.109*** 
(2.064) 
8.428*** 
(2.156) 
14.109*** 
(2.750) 
Log population 
-1.697* 
(0.951) 
-2.407* 
(1.232) 
-2.415* 
(1.392) 
0.351 
(1.152) 
Government size 
0.072 
(0.063) 
0.009 
(0.160) 
0.218 
(0.217) 
-0.104 
(0.175) 
Democracy 
-7.655*** 
(2.103) 
-4652* 
(2.701) 
-3.013 
(3.237) 
-1.961 
(2.897) 
Democracy
2
 
0.749*** 
(0.197) 
0.351 
(0.248) 
0.265 
(0.294) 
0.343 
(0.275) 
FISC.DEC 
-0.663** 
(0.259) 
   
FISC.DEC  * Democ-
racy 
0.116*** 
(0.032) 
   
ADM.DEC   
-0.433** 
(0.189) 
  
ADM.DEC  * Democ-
racy 
 
0.076*** 
(0.027) 
  
POL.DEC1-Authority   
-6.333 
(8.819) 
 
POL.DEC1 * Democ-
racy 
  
2.392* 
(1.295) 
 
POL.DEC2-Electoral    
-41.963** 
(19.929) 
POL.DEC2 * Democ-
racy 
   
3.364* 
(2.592) 
     
Intercept 
-40.241** 
(19.206) 
-42.339** 
(20.517) 
-27.017 
(22.592) 
-82.450*** 
(24.387) 
Obs. 66 72 58 57 
Adj. R
2
 0.800 0.698 0.569 0.771 
Comment: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
That is, in highly democratic countries fiscal decentralization leads to lower corruption 
levels. The predicted value of a highly democratic country where 60% of the total govern-
ment revenue is spend by sub-national governments (highly fiscally decentralized) is a CPI 
value on 88.2. The predicted CPI value for an equally fiscally decentralized but highly au-
thoritarian country is 16.7. 
 
Robustness analysis 
To analyze how sensitive my results are, I need to do conduct several robustness checks. 
The results are considered robust first when the direction of the effects of the key variables 
does not change and remain significant when I try different model specifications. First, I 
test an alternative corruption measure to ensure that my results are not driven by a particu-
lar corruption measure. I therefore test my interaction term in identical models as seen in 
table 4, but with the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as the de-
pendent variable. The WGI measure is another perception-based corruption indicator. The 
detailed results from this analysis are found in Appendix II and they do not differ from 
those achieved with the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measure. The interaction ef-
fects with all four decentralization variables are still positive and significant. This gives fur-
ther credit to my findings.  
       Second, for robustness, I vary the indices of democracy. I replace the Freedom 
House/Polity democracy index with its respective components: the Freedom House index 
and the Polity index. The results remained largely unchanged, with the same direction and 
significance level on the effects. This confirms my findings.  
       Third, I need to test if my relationships hold under the control for other variables that 
previous research has found affect corruption levels. In table 5, two of the interaction terms 
– the one with fiscal decentralization and the one with administrative decentralization – are 
controlled for fewer than four different groups of rival explanations of corruption. Several 
control variables are added, one group at a time. In model 1, the interaction term with fiscal 
decentralization is tested under the control for several economic factors that have proven 
to affect corruption levels. In model 2, political control factors related to democracy and 
governance are included, in model 3 cultural factors including ethnic fractionalization and 
the proportion of Protestants in the population. In model 4, the interaction term is tested 
under control for the variable British legal origin together with GDP per capita, as legal 
origin might capture the economical sophistication of a country. In model 5-8, the interac-
tion term with administrative decentralization is controlled for under the same groups of 
control variables. 
  
       As seen in table 5, the effect of the interaction term between fiscal decentralization and 
democracy remains robust to the inclusion of the alternative explanation variables. The  
size of  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  variable is  reduced  somewhat and  the 
  
 
 
TABLE 5, OLS CROSS-COUNTRY ESTIMATES. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CPI 
 
Model 1 
Economy 
Model 2 
Politics 
Model 3 
Culture 
Model 4 
Legal origin 
Model 5 
Economy 
Model 6 
Politics 
Model 7 
Culture 
Model 8 
Legal origin 
Democracy 
-6.279** 
(2.453) 
-7.431*** 
(2.544) 
-7.947*** 
(2.251) 
-7.106*** 
(1.974) 
-5.884** 
(2.764) 
-5.216* 
(2.964) 
-5.608** 
(2.555) 
-4.701* 
(2.387) 
Democracy
2
 
0.712*** 
(0.215) 
0.849*** 
(0.230) 
0.970*** 
(0.194) 
0.733*** 
(0.184) 
0.471* 
(0.255) 
0.503* 
(0.262) 
0.562** 
(0.222) 
0.401* 
(0.216) 
FISC.DEC 
-0.353 
(0.227) 
-0.448 
(0.289) 
-0.296 
(0.269) 
-0.538** 
(0.256) 
    
FISC.DEC * democra-
cy 
0.066** 
(0.029) 
0.106*** 
(0.036) 
0.066* 
(0.035) 
0.105*** 
(0.031) 
    
ADM.DEC     
-0.349* 
(0.194) 
-0.463** 
(0.178) 
-0.410** 
(0.159) 
-0.289 
(0.177) 
ADM.DEC * democra-
cy 
    
0.074** 
(0.028) 
0.088*** 
(0.026) 
0.064*** 
(0.023) 
0.060** 
(0.025) 
Log GDP/capita 
10.803*** 
(2.719) 
  
8.917*** 
(1.966) 
10.785*** 
(2.933) 
  
11.626*** 
(1.850) 
Trade openness 
0.018 
(0.032) 
   
0.065 
(0.041) 
   
Education level 
0.625 
(0.986) 
   
-0.671 
(1.034) 
   
Female representa-
tion 
 
0.320* 
(0.186) 
   
0.594*** 
(0.202) 
  
Parliamentarism  
3.818 
(3.737) 
   
4.432 
(4.472) 
  
List PR  
-2.736 
(3.417) 
   
-5.301 
(4.208) 
  
Checks & balances  
-0.198 
(1.568) 
   
-0.811 
(2.029) 
  
Ethnic fractionaliza-
tion 
  
-5.498 
(6.841) 
   
-20.761*** 
(6.939) 
 
Protestants   
0.231*** 
(0.068) 
   
0.342*** 
(0.077) 
 
British legal origin    
6.913** 
(2.964) 
   
10.484*** 
(3.234) 
         
Intercept 
-61.892** 
(23.180) 
43.952*** 
(7.929) 
44.990*** 
(8.257) 
-31.155* 
(17.486) 
-41.901* 
(23.000) 
-47.510*** 
(10.128) 
58.527*** 
(9.424) 
-54.432*** 
(18.921) 
Obs. 69 68 67 68 71 77 76 75 
Adj. R
2
 0.774 0.739 0.801 0.816 0.705 0.619 0.703 0.741 
Comment:  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
statistical significant level varies a bit, but the effect remains positive and statistically signifi-
cant.  The earlier conclusions do still hold: the level of democracy condition the relation-
ship between fiscal decentralization and corruption.  
       Briefly, the effects of the control variables are again mostly as expected, although many 
of the variables are statistically insignificant. Among those variables that are statistically 
significant in table 5, GDP per capita have a strong positive effect and countries with a 
large proportion of Protestants are less corrupt. This goes in line with previous research.  
       The results of the identical models with the interaction term with administrative decen-
tralization looks very similar to those achieved with the fiscal decentralization variable. As 
illustrated in table 5 are the coefficient of the interaction term with administrative decentral-
ization a little bit smaller under control for alternative explanations, but still positive and 
statistically significant. The results are thus considered robust and there is a significant in-
teraction effect of administrative decentralization and democracy.  
       In table 6, the results for the same models but with the interaction terms with both 
political decentralization variables are shown. These results tell a different story than the 
one seen with fiscal and administrative decentralization. Under control for alternative ex-
planation, the interaction terms with these two decentralization variables lose significance. 
As such, trade openness, female representation, ethnic fractionalization, and the proportion 
of Protestants better explain corruption levels than any of the interaction term between 
political decentralization and democracy. The interaction effect of political decentralization 
and democracy are therefore not considered robust.  
 
Discussion  
The statistical analysis set out to answer the research question about whether the level of 
democracy condition the relationship between decentralization and corruption, and wheth-
er there was any support for the hypothesis that decentralization is more likely to curb cor-
ruption in democracies compared to authoritarian countries. The analysis lends support to 
this conditional effect of decentralization on corruption. I found no unconditional effect of 
fiscal and administrative decentralization on corruption in the baseline models, but when 
interacted with democracy, these decentralization types have a significant effect upon cor-
ruption. Fiscal and administrative decentralization is associated with lower corruption in 
democracies and higher corruption in authoritarian countries. Consequently, as predicted by 
the hypothesis, democracy is a necessary condition for fiscal and administrative decentrali-
zation to prevent corruption.  
  
       These results contradict the findings in Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés’ (2011) study. Kyri-
acou and Roca-Sagalés claim that there is no interaction effect between fiscal decentraliza-
tion and the experience of democracy. But when democracy is measured with a continuous 
measure instead of Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés’ democracy dummy, the level of democracy 
do indeed condition the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption. In 
relation to Lessman and Markwardt’s (2009) study, in which they claim that press freedom 
condition the relationship between decentralization and corruption, my findings contribute 
to a further understanding of the relationship. My findings support the notion that not only 
free information flows, but also citizen’s capacity to act on information conditions the rela-
tionship between decentralization and corruption. 
       The puzzling part of my results is that not all decentralization types have the same 
impact upon corruption. Unlike fiscal and administrative decentralization, political decen-
tralization does not have a robust effect on corruption – not in terms of whether sub-
national decision-makers are elected, neither in terms of whether sub-national governments 
have decision-making authority on important aspects of governance. Most previous empiri-
cal studies have found that political decentralization have either a negative or a non-
significant effect upon corruption, but it is surprising that the effect of political decentrali-
zation on corruption is insignificant also when interacted with the level of democracy. I 
would not expect a general unconditional effect of political decentralization upon corrup-
tion. But interacted with the level of democracy, it seems more probable that political de-
centralization has a significant effect on corruption in more democratic countries. Howev-
er, my results indicate that it does not have a big impact on corruption whether or not sub-
national governments are directly elected or have important decision-making powers – no 
matter the level of democracy. When it comes to intergovernmental design, what matters is 
at which government level fiscal and administrative resources are located. In light of the 
theoretical accountability models, these results are a bit puzzling. The accountability models 
predict that decentralization increases accountability and thus reduces corruption, but how 
is having resources without great decision-making authority at sub-national levels an im-
provement of accountability? These results might indicate that the models predicting that 
decentralization improves accountability are exaggerated and that it is other mechanisms 
that steer the relationship between decentralization and corruption. 
       The results of my analysis are limited to the quality of my data. As mentioned in the 
data section, my variable for fiscal decentralization does not capture if sub-national units 
own the resources spent by them. This data limitation matters to the interpretation of my 
findings.  From this data, I can conclude that for explaining variation in corruption levels, it 
  
matters where fiscal and administrative resources are located, but it is not possible to draw 
any further conclusions on whether it matters if sub-national governments control these 
resources and have the power to make expenditure and personnel decisions. Theoretically, 
this might be an important distinction. An intergovernmental design where central govern-
ments simply transfer conditional resources to sub-national governments might affect cor-
ruption levels in a different way than a governmental design where sub-national govern-
ments own the resources and can make expenditure and personnel decisions. In order to 
detangle which mechanisms of decentralization and exactly which form of intergovernmen-
tal design that affect corruption, we need to study the relationship between decentralization, 
corruption and democracy in a more disaggregated framework. 
       Another data limitation that have consequences for my analysis, is the fact that many 
authoritarian or weak democratic countries are excluded from the analysis due to lack of 
data. When the countries that are included in the analysis is compared with all the countries 
that are excluded, it is clear that the mean level of democracy is far lower among those 
countries excluded. This might have consequences for the generalizability of my results. It 
is hard to tell if the results of the statistical analysis would have looked different if more 
authoritarian countries were included in the sample.  
       Additionally, even though I use a lag-structure between my dependent and independ-
ent variables and have proven that my results are consistent with different model specifica-
tion, I cannot completely exclude the possibility of reversed causality. It is, for example, 
possible that corrupt officials might choose to create more complex structures of govern-
ment to shield their corrupt activities. If so, decentralized structures are caused by, rather 
than the causes of, corruption.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have examined the extent to which the level of democracy determines the 
effect of decentralization on corruption. While there is an expectation within the policy 
community that decentralization curbs corruption, previous research on the relationship 
has been inconclusive. I have emphasized the importance of context in understanding the 
relationship between decentralization and corruption, and hypothesized that the level of 
democracy might be an important determinant of this relationship. To test if the level of 
democracy conditions the relationship between decentralization and corruption, I have 
employed a cross-country regression analysis where I have tested for several decentraliza-
tion measures. The findings show support for the hypothesis. Unlike the lion share of the 
  
literature, I found no significant unconditional impact of fiscal and administrative decentral-
ization on corruption. I did, however, find a strong effect of fiscal and administrative de-
centralization when interacted with democracy. My results hence support the notion that 
the impact of fiscal and administrative decentralization on corruption is contextualized, and 
that the appropriateness of fiscal and administrative decentralization as a tool to prevent 
corruption depends on the level of democracy within a country. Political decentralization, 
on the other hand, does not have robust impact on corruption and thus seem to be an inef-
fective tool for curbing corruption in general. 
       These results have interest both at a research and a policy level. The results comple-
ment the current academic literature on decentralization and corruption by introducing the 
determining effect of the level of democracy on this relationship. The study thus contrib-
utes to a deeper understanding of the complexity of this relationship. Focusing on only 
average effects of decentralization on corruption gives a misleading picture of the relation-
ship and future research on decentralization and corruption need to account for democra-
cy’s determining role in the effect of fiscal and administrative decentralization on corrup-
tion. This is, however, only an initial study of a relationship that deserves further attention. 
The question about which exact mechanisms related to decentralization that affect corrup-
tion is left unanswered. In order to get a deeper understanding of the relationship, future 
research should be aimed at exploring the relationship between decentralization, corrup-
tion, and democracy in a more disaggregated framework.  
       On a policy level, there seems to be legitimate reasons to question assumptions that 
decentralization is an appropriate tool for curbing corruption in all contexts. One should 
always be careful to draw policy prescriptions from one study on a previously unverified 
relationship. However, if the results of this study are proven to be robust in future studies, 
organizations such as the World Bank should refrain from advising countries with weak 
democratic institutions to decentralize in order to keep corruption at bay. All types of de-
centralization seem to be an unfit tool for fighting corruption in countries without demo-
cratic institutions that give citizens information about government behavior and the capaci-
ty to act upon the given information. It should be noted, as Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 
(2011) point out, that countries may decentralize for other reasons than for curbing corrup-
tion. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have, for example, decentralized in the ef-
forts to convert from socialist system to market economy (2011: 214f).  Other countries 
have decentralized in order to accommodate ethnic and linguistic diversity within the coun-
try (Charron 2009). But even when the motivations to decentralize respond to other issues 
than preventing corruption, fiscal and administrative decentralization are still likely to sig-
  
nificantly affect corruption. Granting sub-national governments in authoritarian countries 
with greater fiscal power or administrative resources is expected to increase corruption. 
Since corruption is a major impediment to economic and social development, this is an 
important finding that deserves attention. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I: Description and source of variables 
 
CPI: Cross-country corruption measure that relies on Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI). The variable is on a scale from 0-100 where 0 indicates 
a very corrupt government and 100 very little corruption. Averages for the years 2000-
2009. Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally the Heritage 
Foundation (2014). 
 
WGI: Measure of the control of corruption based on the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. Indicator with a score between -2 and 2, with higher scores cor-
responding to better outcomes. Averages 2000-2009. Source: the QoG standard dataset 
(Teorell et al 2015), originally Kaufmann et al (2010). 
 
FISC.DEC: Fiscal decentralization. Revenue share of sub-central governments (local 
and state) in total (local, state and central) public revenues. Averages 1990-1999. 
Source: IMF’s Government Finance statistics. 
 
ADM.DEC: Administrative decentralization. Subnational government employment 
share: non-central government employment as % of total government employment, av-
erages 1993-1995. Source: Treisman (2002).  
 
POL.DEC1-Authority: Sub-national decision-making authority, a measure of political 
decentralizaiton. Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if state/provinces have authority 
over taxing, spending and/or legislating during 1990-1999. Authority over “cultural 
affairs” or “planning” in Communist systems does not qualify.  Source: The World 
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 2012, Beck et al (2001). 
 
  
POL.DEC2-Electoral: Electoral decentralization, a measure of political decentralizai-
ton. Index between 0 and 1 on the existence of elections at the municipal or 
state/provincial levels in 1996. Higher levels indicate higher electoral decentralization. 
Source: Schneider (2003). 
 
Democracy: Democracy is measured in an eleven point index ranging from 0 (least 
democratic) to 10 (most democratic). The average of Freedom House is transformed to a 
scale ranging from 0-10 and Polity that is transformed to a 0-10 scale and these two 
measures are then averaged together. Averages 1990-1999. Source: the QoG standard 
dataset (Teorell et al 2015). 
 
Political regime: Binary measure of democracy during the 1990s. Coded 1 if democra-
cy, 0 if otherwise. A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legisla-
ture is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there 
is de facto existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple par-
ties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage. 
Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally Cheibub, Antonioi, 
Gandhi & Vreeland (2010). 
 
GDP per capita: Natural logarithm of a given country’s gross domestic product per 
capita, averages 1990-1999. Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), 
originally Gleditsch (2002). 
 
Population size: Natural logarithm of a given country’s population size. Source: the 
QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally The World Economic Outlook, 
IMF (2014). 
 
Government size: Total government expenditure divided by GDP, averages 1990-1999. 
Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally The World Economic 
Outlook, IMF (2014).  
 
Trade openness: The sum of export and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP, averages 1990-1999. Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 
2015), originally the World Development Indicators (Group 2012). 
  
 
Education level: Average schooling years for men and women (25+). Source: the QoG 
standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally Barro and Lee (2013). 
 
Female representation: Share of women in the lower house of parliament. Source: the 
QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
Data. 
 
Parliamentarism: Dummy variable taking the value 0 if the country was classified as a 
parliamentary democracy. Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), origi-
nally Cheibub, Antonioi, Gandhi & Vreeland (2010). 
 
List PR: Dummy variable taking the value 0 if a country has an electoral system classi-
fied as list proportional representation, 0 if otherwise. Source: the QoG standard dataset 
(Teorell et al 2015), originally Bormann and Golder (2013). 
 
Checks & balances: Checks and balances. Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell 
et al 2015), originally the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2001).  
 
Ethnic Fractionalization: The variable reflects the likelihood that two randomly select-
ed persons from a given country will not belong to the same racial and linguistic group. 
Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat &Wacziag (2003). 
 
Protestants: Protestants as percentage of the population. Source: the QoG standard 
dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally La Porta et al (1999). 
 
British legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country has British legal 
origin, 0 if otherwise. Source: the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al 2015), originally 
La Porta et al (1999).  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
TABLE 7, SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INCLUDED VARIABLES 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
CPI  39.163 21.387 8.64 95.73 181 
WGI  -0.06 1.002 -2 2 191 
FISC.DEC  20.712 14.257 2 57 73 
ADM.DEC  37.84 22.359 0 93 90 
POL.DEC1-Authority  0.5 0.503 0 1 78 
POL.DEC2-Electoral 0.562 0.263 0.1 1 65 
Democracy 5.293 3.584 0 10 180 
Democracy
2
 40.783 38.726 0 100 180 
Log GDP/capita 8.820 1.285 5.71 11.60 189 
Log Population 1.780 2.032 -4.51 5.74 163 
Government size 9.10 17.438 -21 176 174 
Trade openness 89.33 44.369 23 378 178 
Education level 7.813 2.905 1.2 13.27 143 
Female representation 15.79 10.168 0 49 189 
Parliamentarism 0.269 0.445 0 1 193 
List PR 0.290 0.455 0 1 193 
Checks and balances 2.90 1.527 1 9 174 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.44 0.257 0 1 187 
Protestants 13.03 21.283 0 98 179 
British colony 0.295 0.457 0 1 193 
British legal origin 0.316 0.466 0 1 193 
  
TABLE 8, COUNTRIES WITH DECENTRALIZATION DATA 
FISC.DEC ADM.DEC POL.DEC1-Authority POL.DEC2-Electoral 
Albania Albania Argentina Albania 
Argentina Algeria Armenia Argentina 
Australia Angola Australia Australia 
Austria Argentina Austria Austria 
Bahrain Armenia Azerbaijan Azerbaijan 
Belarus Australia Bahrain Belarus 
Belgium Austria Bangladesh Belgium 
Bolivia Bahamas Belarus Bolivia 
Botswana Bahrain Belgium Botswana 
Brazil Barbados Belize Brazil 
Bulgaria Belarus Benin Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso Belgium Bhutan Canada 
Canada Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Chile 
Chile Botswana Botswana China 
China Bulgaria Brazil Croatia 
Colombia Cameroon Bulgaria Czech Republic 
Costa Rica Canada Canada Denmark 
Croatia Central African Republic Central African Republic Dominican Republic 
Czech Republic Chile Chad Estonia 
Denmark China Chile Fiji 
Dominican Republic Colombia Colombia Finland 
Estonia Congo Comoros France 
Ethiopia Croatia Congo Georgia 
Fiji Denmark Democratic Republic of Congo Germany 
Finland Ecuador Costa Rica Guatemala 
France Egypt Cote d’Ivore Hungary 
Germany Estonia Croatia Iceland 
Hungary Fiji Cuba India 
Iceland Finland Cyprus Indonesia 
India France Czech Republic Iran 
Indonesia Gabon Dominican Republic Iraq 
Iran Gambia Ecuador Ireland 
Ireland Georgia Egypt Israel 
Israel Germany El Salvador Italy 
Italy Ghana Equatorial Guinea Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan Greece Eritrea Kenya 
Kenya Guinea Bissau Estonia Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan Guyana Ethiopia Latvia 
Latvia Honduras Finland Lithuania 
Lithuania Hungary France Luxembourg 
Luxembourg India Gabon Malaysia 
Malaysia Indonesia Georgia Mauritius 
Mauritius Ireland Germany Mexico 
Mexico Italy Ghana Moldova 
Moldova Japan Greece Mongolia 
Mongolia Jordan Grenada Netherlands 
Netherlands Kazakhstan Guatemala Nicaragua 
New Zealand Kenya Hungary Norway 
Nicaragua Laos India Panama 
Norway Lebanon Italy Paraguay 
Panama Lithuania Kuwait Peru 
Paraguay Macedonia Luxembourg Philippines 
Peru Malta Malaysia Poland 
Philippines Mauritius Mexico Portugal 
Poland Moldova Morocco Romania 
Portugal Morocco Mozambique Russia 
Romania Myanmar Nepal Senegal 
Russia Netherlands Nigeria Slovakia 
Slovakia New Zealand Oman Slovenia 
Slovenia Norway Philippines South Africa 
South Africa Pakistan Russia Spain 
Spain Philippines Senegal Sweden 
Sri Lanka Poland Serbia Tajikistan 
Swaziland Portugal Singapore Trinidad and Tobago 
Sweden Russia Slovenia United Kingdom 
Switzerland Senegal South Africa United States 
Tajikistan Singapore Spain Zimbabwe 
Thailand Slovakia Sudan 
 
Trinidad and Tobago South Africa Sweden 
 
United Kingdom South Korea Switzerland 
 
United States Spain Taiwan 
 
Uruguay Sri Lanka Timor-Leste 
 
Zimbabwe Sweden Trinidad and Tobago 
 
  
 
Switzerland United Arab Emirates 
 
 
Syria United Kingdom 
 
 
Tanzania United States 
 
 
Thailand Uzbekistan 
 
 
Togo Venezuela 
 
 
Tunisia 
  
 
Turkey 
  
 
Uganda 
  
 
Ukraine 
  
 
United Kingdom 
  
 
United States 
  
 
Uruguay 
  
 
Venezuela 
  
 
Vietnam 
  
 
Yemen 
  
 
Zambia 
  
 
Zimbabwe 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
TABLE 9, SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INCLUDED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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FISC.DEC 1.000 0.687* 0.313 0.173 0.183 0.358* 0.255* -0.051 -0.183 0.293* 0.314* 0.186 -0.003 0.221 -0.188 0.327* -0.081 
ADM.DEC  1.000 0.516* 0.331* 0.265* 0.299* 0.405* 0.197 -0.255* 0.305* 0.243* 0.168 0.109 0.233* -0.316* 0.162 -0.136 
POL.DEC1-
Authority 
  1.000 0.272 0.429* 0.276* 0.353* 0.089 -0.118 0.242 0.257* 0.235* 0.109 0.409* -0.125 0.156 0.087 
POL.DEC2-Electoral    1.000 0.393* 0.416* 0.363* -0.015 -0.171 0.349* 0.296* 0.091 -0.105 0.207 -0.271* 0.093 -0.073 
Democracy     1.000 0.490* -0.167* 0.006 0.078 0.612* 0.162* 0.591* 0.325* 0.611* -0.460* 0.358* 0.141 
Log GDP/capita      1.000 -0.016 -0.042 0.283* 0.775* 0.205* 0.320* 0.218* 0.139 -0.385* 0.096* -0.069 
Log Population       1.000 0.060 -0.391* -0.132 0.186* -0.222* 0.036 -0.015 0.179* -0.292* -0.206* 
Gov. size        1.000 -0.010 0.118 -0.035 0.018 0.036 0.009 -0.058 -0.049 -0.081 
Trade openness         1.000 0.208* 0.029 0.097 -0.014 0.032 -0.111 0.034 0.052 
Education level          1.000 0.181* 0.377* 0.307* 0.285* -0.469* 0.266* -0.043 
Female represe.           1.000 0.039 0.303* 0.098 -0.063 0.202* -0.182* 
Parliamentarism            1.000 0.075 0.445* -0.278* 0.270* 0.240* 
List PR             1.000 0.281* -0.141 0.033 -0.336* 
Checks & balances              1.000 -0.263* 0.325* 0.141 
Ethnic fraction.               1.000 -0.205* 0.046 
Protestants                1.000 0.278* 
British legal origin                 1.000 
Appendix 2: Robustness tests 
 
TABLE 10, OLS CROSS-COUNTRY ESTIMATES. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WGI 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Log GDP/capita 
0.445*** 
(0.095) 
0.445*** 
(0.094) 
0.300*** 
(0.102) 
0.653*** 
(0.123) 
Log population 
-0.087** 
(0.043) 
-0.148*** 
(0.056) 
-0.144** 
(0.062) 
0.015 
(0.052) 
Government size 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Democracy 
-0.352*** 
(0.095) 
-0.230* 
(0.123) 
-0.180 
(0.150) 
-0.045 
(0.130) 
Democracy
2
 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.375) 
FISC.DEC 
-0.039*** 
(0.012) 
   
FISC.DEC  * Democ-
racy 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
   
ADM.DEC   
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
  
ADM.DEC  * Democ-
racy 
 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
  
POL.DEC1-Authority   
-0.402 
(0.416) 
 
POL.DEC1 * Democ-
racy 
  
0.118* 
(0.061) 
 
POL.DEC2-Electoral    
-2.172** 
(0.893) 
POL.DEC2 * Democ-
racy 
   
0.176 
(0.116) 
 
     
Intercept 
-3.392*** 
(0.864) 
-3.259*** 
(0.932) 
-2.340** 
(1.063) 
-5.773*** 
(1.093) 
Obs. 66 72 59 57 
Adj. R
2
 0.801 0.702 0.544 0.777 
Comment: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses 
  
